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duties of the citizen, both as law-maker and as subject to the law.

Much that is sound and deeply pondered has been written by various competent and sincere thinkers with a similar end in view—the end of establishing democracy upon sure principles and of proving the permanent value of our American institutions. It is doubtful, however, if any study so penetrating, so immediately convincing, so free from philosophic objections, as this of David Jayne Hill's has heretofore been given to the public. Though the author makes no attempt to solve in detail problems which must for a long time to come puzzle the conscience and the reason of the American people, it is not too much to say that he has marked out that road from which the wayfarer, though a fool, need not stray.

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THE AMERICAN ARMY. By William Harding Carter, Major General, United States Army. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1915.

No doubt many Americans have been guilty in the past of a certain excess of complacency regarding our national valor and the security of our country from aggression—a state of mind coupled in some cases with an attitude of indifference, if not of contempt, toward the American Army. Upon the subject of preparedness, however, the European war has startled us wide awake. Popular sentiment in favor of reasonable preparation for possible war is now probably even stronger than the many surface indications show. But what is reasonable preparation? Leaving out of account the moral fervor of the extreme militarists and of the extreme peace-advocates, what military policy and method may we best choose? These are questions that thousands of American citizens are earnestly asking. As a nation, we are in a mood to welcome authentic and detailed information regarding our army, and to give careful heed to the soberly thought-out conclusions of responsible experts.

It is likely, therefore, that Major General William Harding Carter's recently published book, *The American Army*, will receive more nearly the amount of attention it deserves than would have been the case if it had been issued in less disquieting times; and it is fortunate that just now so sound and rational a book is available. It should be said at once that this thoroughly informed and methodical treatise is by no means excessively warlike in tone. It has nothing in common with such violent flagellations of national over-confidence as Homer Lea's *The Valor of Ignorance*, and the author appears to be a less aggressive militarist than even so sane an advocate of strong armaments as the late Admiral Mahan. Nor is General Carter's account of the present condition of our military affairs designed to be especially alarming. On the contrary, it is reassuring.

In the first place, the book gives reason for satisfaction in the present organization and personnel of our regular army, properly emphasizing the notable efficiency with which many varied and difficult tasks have been performed and bringing to notice departments of work concerning which little is generally known. In the second place—and here lies the special merit of the treatise—it points out for the future a policy that is reasonably consistent with the past, consonant with common sense, and in harmony with the ideals of a great democracy.

After demonstrating in brief though sufficiently convincing fashion the improbability of the supposition that the generally peaceful disposition of this country will invariably keep it out of war, and the folly of the belief that defenselessness is a safeguard against aggression, General Carter proceeds to define the lessons which we have learned—or ought to have learned—from the past. The result reveals a remarkable consensus of opinion from the time of Washington and Hamilton down to the days of Taft and Wilson. We ought to nationalize our forces; we should no longer attempt to make war as a federation of forty-eight States. The basis of our defense should be a Federal army of regulars and volunteers under the direct control of the President. The militia of the States should be composed of men enlisting with the distinct agreement that their services should not be called for otherwise than as provided in the Constitution. Moreover, the term of enlistment for volunteers should be, in time of peace, two years, this period to be extended in case of war to three years, or the duration of the war. These are the lessons of the Revolutionary War and of the Civil War; they are also the chief lessons of the war with Spain.

Fundamentally, then, General Carter's book is a plea for a well-organized volunteer system as opposed to the present plan which makes the militia practically our sole reliance apart from the regular army. "The organized militia," writes the author, in justifiable italics, "as yet is the only available military force other than the regulars, with any training whatever; but the error of the whole situation, and one needing immediate remedy, lies in the attempt to nationalize the militia of the States and yet retain it under control of the governors until actually in the service of the United States during war, and then to continue the appointment and promotion of officers in the hands of the governors." Up to the present, the efforts made to insure the nationalization of State troops in time of war have brought no satisfactory results; nor does there appear to be any real hope of patching up a system that is essentially illogical and cumbersome. As an illustration of the embarrassments at present attending the mobilization of our land forces, may be cited the law, which provides that only after the organized land militia of any arm or class shall have been called into service may volunteers of that particular arm or class be raised. Since for service beyond

our borders the militia cannot be called but must volunteer, it is evident that, in the case for example of a war with Mexico, the President would be obliged to wait until each militia organization had decided whether three-fourths of the minimum number prescribed as the strength of that particular unit would volunteer, before calling out volunteers of similar arms or classes.

First among the objections to the militia system as a mainstay stand the limitations defined by the Constitution upon the employment of this force—limitations which heavily discount its usefulness except for the manning of coast defenses, a service for which it is both needed and eminently fit. But this is not all. A practical disadvantage of a sort unlikely to occur to a layman, and one that cannot well be removed by any legislative makeshift, is found in the fact that there is an inevitable lack of proportion in the distribution of State troops among the various branches of the service. Militia in the future as in the past will consist mainly of infantry; cavalry and artillery to balance this defect must be supplied by the regular army, with the result that the organization of the latter “can never be based upon its use as a complete field army, for it must always comprise an undue proportion of cavalry, field artillery, and special branches to balance the infantry of the citizen soldiery.” A further reason for preferring the system of organized Federal volunteers—the system that seems in outline the simplest, the most direct in action, the freest from objections of all sorts—is that it would remove those inequalities of taxation which arise from the fact that some States maintain miniature armies, while others go to the opposite extreme.

As one peruses General Carter’s many-sided discussion, the conviction grows that our present plan of reliance upon militia and upon levies of untrained volunteers enlisted after war has been declared is dangerously inadequate. The author concludes—and it is not easy to find a genuine point of disagreement with him—that a force of Federal volunteers should be created as a supplement to the regular army and maintained both in peace and in war. “The batteries, troops, companies, battalions, and regiments, of the Federal volunteers should be organized in Congressional districts and in such numbers as may be proportionally and equitably allotted by the President, the total force not to exceed the strength authorized by Congress, and the officers of such organizations to be appointed by the President. . . . All laws providing for the use of the militia in conflict with the Constitution, as interpreted by the Attorney-General of the United States, should be formally repealed and no further attempts made to provide for the use of the national guard and organized militia for general war purposes. It should be clearly understood that those who desire to serve in war without regard to State or National borders must attach themselves to the Federal volunteers.” There appears to be nothing

revolutionary in these propositions; on the contrary, the plan outlined seems to be in obvious accord with the Constitution and with the spirit of our Government. It does not savor of militarism; it does savor of common sense.

Apart from obvious general considerations of efficiency and ease in operation, there are aspects of military policy that can only be understood through a somewhat careful examination of detailed facts. Among these is the matter of economy. One of the principal objections to short-term enlistments is the increased expenditures to which they give rise in the form of pensions—a fact of which the experience of the Government immediately after the close of the war with Spain furnishes regrettable but convincing proof. The fault, however, is not all with human nature, but in major part with a system which inevitably results in relative injustice if it does not lend itself to fraud. The author's analysis of this subject leads to an important conclusion which is backed by reason and by army records: "One man enlisted for three years furnishes but one probable pensioner, and his services will be far more valuable than those of six men called in for six months, each of whom may become a pensioner. The three-months' men might, and probably would, in the same period furnish twelve pensioners." General Carter does not, of course, urge a policy of heartless parsimony; he merely contends that, if lavish expenditure is necessary, it may be applied to better advantage in preparing for war than in repairing a needless waste after the war is over.

Another question upon which statistics throw a rather striking light is that of reserves. It is surprising to find that under the new system of long enlistments, with part of the service in the reserves, it will be many years before any considerable number of reservists will be accumulated; yet when the number of men discharged in one year from an average body of regulars by expiration of service is compared with the number whose connection with the organization is severed in some other way during the same period, the truth of this proposition becomes manifest.

Of only slightly less interest to the general reader than his discussions of general policy are General Carter's accounts of more technical matters—his review of army administration and of army command, his sketch of the history and work of the General Staff Corps, his recommendations for the creation and maintenance of an "expeditionary force" to serve as a model tactical unit and school of practice, for the formation of a body of "colonial troops," and for the establishment of regimental depots to pass trained men into the ranks of organizations employed in active campaign. On the one hand, it is instructive to observe the manner in which we have "muddled through" in attaining the degree of military efficiency of which we can now justly boast; on the other hand, it is surprising to learn what a mass of experience and expert opinion

lies back of the modest proposals for change which the author urges.

General Carter's book possesses very little of the facile interest of a popular magazine article. Far from being sensational or over-emphatic, it errs if at all in the direction of an excessive fulness and circumspection of statement, which tend to diminish the force of its effect upon the casual reader. The author, too, while he never indulges in technicality to the point of obscurity, perhaps takes for granted more familiarity with the problems of the army than most laymen possess. His book requires some study for its proper understanding, but it will amply repay the time and attention spent upon it, by putting the reader in possession of authentic facts and an instructive point of view.

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GERMAN CULTURE. Edited by Professor W. P. Paterson of Edinburgh University. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915.

It is a curious phenomenon of the times that a book so encyclopedic in scope and method, so entirely impartial in tone and unrheterical in style as the symposium upon German culture to which a number of British scholars under the editorship of Professor Paterson have contributed, should be produced at this time with a view to enlightening public opinion. In contents the book is admirable, allowance being made for the great extent of the subject-matter treated and the narrowness of the space to which the authors are confined. The introductory historical sketch, "Germany and Prussia," by Richard Lodge, professor of history in the University of Edinburgh, is a model of clear narration, of wise selection and emphasis. With the skill and breadth of view requisite to make a broad survey instructive, A. D. Lindsay, Fellow and Tutor in Balliol College, Oxford, outlines the characteristics of German philosophy. Professor J. Arthur Thomson of the University of Aberdeen in discussing the question, "What Science Owes to German Investigators," writes in effect a brief and extraordinarily compact history of modern science. His account is necessarily of somewhat restricted interest, and indeed comes measurably near to being a mere catalogue of names and achievements; but it attains the end of strict impartiality through its comprehensiveness and its conscientious detail. Each of the articles composing the volume is, in fact, a triumph in the art of telling much in little. German Literature is dealt with by John Lees, lecturer on German in the University of Aberdeen; German Art, by G. Baldwin Brown, professor of Fine Arts in the University of Edinburgh; German Music, by D. F. Tovey, Reid Professor of Music in the University of Edinburgh; German Education, by Michael E. Sadler, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Leeds; the political and economic aspects of German nationalism, by D. H. McGregor, professor of Political Economy in the Univer-